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         EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE IN PSYCHIATRY 
 




Summary Epistemic injustice is a harm done to a person in their capacity as an 
epistemic subject (a knower, a reasoner, a questioner) by undermining her capacity to 
engage in epistemic practices such as giving knowledge to others (testifying) or 
making sense of one’s experiences (interpreting). It has been argued that those who 
suffer from medical conditions are more vulnerable to epistemic injustice than the 
healthy. This paper claims that people with mental disorders are even more vulnerable 
to epistemic injustice than those with somatic illnesses. Two kinds of contributory 
factors for epistemic injustice in psychiatric patients are outlined: global and specific. 
Some suggestions are made to counteract the effects of these contributory factors, for 
instance we suggest that physicians should participate in groups where the subjective 
experience of patients is explored, and learn to become more aware of their own 
unconscious prejudices towards psychiatric patients.  
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Epistemic injustice typically arises when a hearer does not take the statements of a 
speaker as seriously as they deserve to be taken. The prime case of epistemic injustice 
is testimonial: the hearer deflates the level of credibility she gives the speaker because 
she is (often unconsciously) prejudiced against the social group to which the speaker 
belongs. Common examples include sexism and racism. In such cases the testimony 
of a woman or a person from an ethnic minority background will be given deflated 
credibility, based on the prejudicial associations between that group and negative 
stereotypes. The reason we chose this approach is that epistemic injustice provides an 
account for why, despite the best intentions, physicians often do not believe what 
psychiatric patients tell them, because of a common prejudicial stereotype of patient 
unreliability. Clarifying some of the reasons for this may make it possible to explore 
ways of combatting the epistemic injustice that we suggest patients, and in particular 
psychiatric patients, are vulnerable to. 
 
It is worth noting here that it is prejudicial or negative stereotypes, not stereotypes per 
se, which often give rise to epistemic injustice. We rely on stereotypes as heuristic 
aids in making credibility judgments because they are often empirically reliable 
generalizations. But negative attitudes towards people with a mental illness may lead 
to negative stereotypes, to generalisations which are resistant to counter-evidence 
owing to what the philosopher, Miranda Fricker2 calls an “ethically bad affective 
investment”. It is these kinds of stereotypes which may lead to epistemic injustice. 
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Epistemic injustice is important in psychiatry because of the persistent negative 
stereotypes that affect people with mental disorders in particular and lead to a 
credibility deficit. The consequence is that patient testimonies and interpretations are 
not acknowledged as credible, and patients are thus undermined in their capacity as 
knowers and contributors to the epistemic effort to reach a correct diagnosis and 
treatment. We suggest that people with mental disorders are even more susceptible to 
epistemic injustice than those with physical illnesses, for reasons that are detailed 
below. 
 
Two of the authors (HC and IJK) have argued that people with physical illnesses are 
vulnerable to epistemic injustice.1 Here we suggest that people with mental disorder 
may be susceptible to even greater epistemic injustice than people with physical 
illnesses. This is mainly due to the high prevalence and great power of negative 
stereotypes of psychiatric illness. As a consequence, the patient may be telling the 
truth, but the doctor deflates the level of credibility which she gives to the patient 
(‘credibility deficit’) and thereby does the patient a distinctive kind of injustice, 
namely epistemic injustice, which undermines the patient specifically in her capacity 
as a giver of knowledge.  
 
This has detrimental effects on individual psychiatric patients, but also for the funding 
of psychiatric services and for the public perception of mental disorder. Many people 
are influenced by negative stereotypes about mental disorders, are ill-informed about 
their true nature, and have little understanding of how to treat them. Some measures 
to improve the current situation are suggested below. 
 
 
2. EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE 
 
The notion of epistemic injustice has been developed by Fricker.2 She was interested 
in how social identity and power affects people’s status as knowers. She gives the 
example of a white police officer who stops a black driver of a car and asks him 
whether the car belongs to him. If the driver truthfully says that it is his, but the 
policeman does not believe him because of racial prejudice, then he does the driver an 
injustice in his capacity as a knower3.  
 
The main type of epistemic injustice which Fricker discusses is ‘testimonial injustice’; 
it emerges from the fact that testifying, i.e. giving information to others, depends 
crucially upon one’s perceived credibility. If a person is seen as lacking credibility her 
testimony will be ignored, treated with suspicion, or might not be solicited at all. Of 
course she may lack credibility for a good reason, e.g. if she is a known liar. 
However, testimonial injustice occurs when a person suffers a ‘credibility deficit’ 
owing to some negative stereotype or prejudice associated with her social group (e.g. 
gender or race). This credibility deficit is unjustified and hence constitutes an 
epistemic injustice. Fricker analyses how negative racial and sexist prejudices unfairly 
deflate the credibility of non-white people and women, such that what they say is 
ignored, marginalized, or otherwise excluded from epistemic consideration. Since 
being able to give information to others is essential to social life and agential action, 
testimonial injustice harms those who suffer from it.  
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Carel and Kidd have argued that people with physical illnesses are more vulnerable to 
epistemic injustice than healthy people1. The testimonies of patients are often 
presumed to be irrelevant, unreliable, confused, or otherwise lacking in credibility 
owing to negative stereotypes associated with ill persons. Such stereotypes include 
viewing ill persons as cognitively impaired or emotionally compromised, owing either 
to their somatic condition or their psychological reactions to it; or as existentially 
unstable, gripped by anxieties such that they ‘cannot think straight’; or that they will 
be psychologically dominated by their illness in a way that warps their capacity to 
accurately describe and report their experiences (e.g. ‘the moaner’ or ‘the drama 
queen’ stereotype). Because illness often evokes strong feelings in sufferers, their 
emotions are often taken by health professionals to have a detrimental effect on 
patients’ thinking, distorting the accounts they give of their illness. This pattern may 
be more acute in cases where subjective symptoms are driving the clinical encounter, 
e.g. unexplained breathlessness, chronic pain, medically unexplained symptoms.23 
 
Of course the credibility of an individual is context-dependent: if someone is talking 
about a subject on which she is an acknowledged expert then she is much more likely 
to be believed than if she is talking about something she is known to have little 
knowledge of. We are sufficiently aware of the existence of people’s unconscious 
desires and beliefs to know that they can be mistaken about their own desires and 
beliefs, but it is also the case that they have exclusive access to many of their desires 
and beliefs. In the interests of epistemic justice, physicians should accept what people 
with mental disorders say about these matters as true unless there is good reason not 
to. Moreover, psychiatric patients who have experience of psychiatric services 
become reluctant to disclose psychotic symptoms because they know it might make 
them more likely to be diagnosed with a psychotic illness and even detained in 
hospital and medicated against their will. If they nonetheless disclose such symptoms 
then psychiatrists might conclude that these symptoms are more severe in the sense 
that the patients are unable to inhibit their expression and/or that their executive 
function is also impaired.  
 
Here are three examples of epistemic injustice affecting psychiatric patients. The 
purpose of these examples is to show how epistemic injustice can be a real problem in 
psychiatry, with possibly devastating effects on the individuals who are telling the 
truth. The personal details of the patients concerned have been altered to preserve 
their anonymity. When one of the authors (PC) was a medical student in Munich he 
saw a young man on an acute psychiatric ward who said he was a relative of the then 
Soviet leader. The responsible consultant took this to be a grandiose delusion, and 
therefore as evidence of a psychotic illness; it later turned out to be true.  
 
The second example is of a woman in her early 50s who was a former nun. The police 
contacted mental health services because they had been alerted by someone doing 
work on her house. They found evidence of smoke damage, but not of fire damage, to 
her house. She was admitted to a psychiatric ward and detained under section 2 of the 
Mental Health Act. She claimed that she had been burning incense in the house for 
many years to drive away evil spirits. During the week she had spent on the ward 
there was no evidence of her trying to ward off evil spirits, or attempting to start a 
fire, or of any psychotic symptoms. The tribunal members concluded that her beliefs 
about incense and evil spirits were compatible with her religious faith, that there was 
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no evidence of a psychotic illness, as had been claimed by the psychiatrist and one of 
the psychiatric nurses, and that section 2 should therefore be rescinded.  
 
The third example is of a young man who was admitted to psychiatric hospital on 
section 2 despite the fact he had agreed all along to be admitted and remain in hospital 
as a voluntary patient. He had been standing near the edge of a high cliff for about an 
hour until passers-by called the police. The staff involved in his care on admission did 
not believe that he could be trusted to remain in hospital on a voluntary basis and 
argued in the tribunal for the maintenance of the section. Fortunately his community 
psychiatric nurse attended the tribunal, stating that he should never have been placed 
on a section, because he had had suicidal thoughts for many years, had gone to the 
same cliff many times in the past, had been admitted to hospital on several occasions 
as a voluntary patient, and had understandable misgivings about the stigma attached 
to being placed on a section. All this had been documented in the hospital notes. She 
conceded that there would always be a risk of deliberate self-harm, but that it was a 
matter of managing the risk without compulsory detention and with the help of his 
friends and family. After hearing this evidence the tribunal members decided to 
rescind the section. 
 
One of the important factors which can predispose to epistemic injustice is a 
widespread misunderstanding of the relationship between emotion and cognition and 
the positive contribution made by emotional input to a broader conception of 
rationality4. A consequence, in a medical and psychiatric context, is that the ‘soft 
evidence’ offered by patients is often met by credibility deflation. In practice this may 
lead to patient reports being ignored or discounted, especially when time pressure and 
other constraints are at play. Conversely, if the ‘hard evidence’ provided by objective 
investigation (e.g. blood tests) is regarded as more reliable, then the opinions of health 
professionals who can access and interpret that evidence may enjoy credibility 
inflation. In some cases it may be better for the doctor to try to treat on the basis of 
the symptoms reported by the patient than on the basis of an abnormal blood test 
result, or an abnormal scan alone. An example of this is the PSA (prostate-specific 
antigen), which is a notoriously unreliable guide for the treatment of prostate cancer.  
 
A psychiatric example is to do with making a diagnosis of epilepsy. Here a patient 
may have some epileptiform waves on the EEG, for instance, but unless there is also 
clinical evidence of altered consciousness and/or involuntary movements which fit 
into a recognized pattern, a diagnosis of epilepsy cannot be made. An EEG can 
confirm but cannot exclude the diagnosis, which is essentially clinical.5  
 
In very general terms, there are two types of contributory conditions for epistemic 
injustice affecting people with mental disorders: global and specific. Global factors 
are those that can affect any patient at risk of psychiatric disorder or those diagnosed 
as having psychiatric disorders. The fear of stigma among those at risk can make early 
intervention difficult and those who have been diagnosed may avoid service use and 
relapse more frequently.  
 
 
3. GLOBAL CONTRIBUTORY CONDITIONS  
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There are three global contributory conditions for epistemic injustice in psychiatric 
illness: (1) problems associated with, and partly caused by, the mental disorder; (2) 
the higher value placed by health professionals on ‘hard’ or objective evidence 
compared to patient reports; and (3) the entrenched negative stereotypes associated 




(1) Psychiatric patients are often disadvantaged – cognitively, socially, and 
economically – and these disadvantages are frequently thought to be the 
patients’ fault. People who suffer from mental disorder are often badly 
educated because the illness has interrupted their education (“dropouts”); they 
are often financially impoverished because the effects of the illness may make 
them unemployable (“lazy”, “dependence culture”); and they are frequently 
socially isolated (“loners”). They may become dependent on substances such 
as nicotine, alcohol and street drugs (“lack of will power”) and frequently 
suffer from physical illnesses. Causes of physical illnesses include substance 
abuse, self-neglect secondary to mental disorder and/or substance abuse, and 
psychotropic medication, e.g. atypical antipsychotics causing cardiovascular 
problems (“down to lifestyle”).  
 
Those suffering from mental disorders are thus often seen to have largely 
brought these disadvantages on themselves and are stigmatized and held 
responsible for these disadvantages.2 Moreover, genetic factors and a 
dysfunctional environment are contributing conditions for some mental 
disorders and are not within the control of those who suffer from these 
disorders. To the extent that such negative stereotypes are shared by their 
voters, politicians, who often look to save public money, will not be motivated 
to redress the imbalance in mental health funding: in 2010/11 mental health 
services were allocated only 10.8% of the NHS budget, although mental 
disorders constituted nearly 22.8% of the disease burden of the NHS.6 The 
President of the Royal College of Psychiatrists, Simon Wessely, notes that 
although there are some positive developments, funding for psychiatric 
services has not increased, the cuts are still with us, and mental health services 
could be subject to 1.5% cuts in 2015.7 A recent parliamentary report 
advocates “whole person” care, which includes mental and physical health, 
and highlights some of the barriers to parity of esteem for mental health.8  
 
(2). Health professionals are trained to place higher value on ‘hard’ or 
objective evidence, namely the results of investigations, than on ‘soft’ or 
subjective evidence, provided by patients. In fact, some such objective 
evidence, e.g. x-rays, MRI scans, is heavily dependent on interpretation, e.g. 
radiologist’s interpretation. This gives health professionals epistemic power, 
because only they have access to this evidence and the training to interpret it. 
Montgomery9 has argued that medicine is not itself a science but rather an 
interpretive practice that relies on clinical reasoning. A physician looks at the 
patient's history along with the presenting physical signs and symptoms and 
juxtaposes these with clinical experience and empirical studies to construct a 
tentative account of the illness with what Montgomery calls ‘clinical 
judgment’.  In psychiatry there is virtually no hard evidence and diagnoses 
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have to be made mainly on the basis of what patients say and how they 
behave. However, some psychiatrists regard their patients as objects of their 
epistemic inquiry rather than participants in an epistemic search for the correct 
diagnosis and best treatment. Luhrmann10 argues that insurance companies 
exercise a more powerful influence over the content of healthcare than doctors 
do in that they promote a biological approach to psychiatry because it yields 
explicit therapeutic rationales, targeted treatments and quantifiable outcomes 
which can be audited more easily. 
 
Despite the lack of objective evidence in psychiatry, many psychiatrists are 
influenced by their general medical training and import this bias into the field. 
Although many acknowledge the biopsychosocial model of mental disorders, 
they often retain their biological orientation.11 Biological psychiatry has been 
dominant since the 1950s, when the first anti-psychotic drugs were introduced, 
and there is little evidence that this is changing significantly. This is partly 
because the biological approach has practical benefits (e.g. psychiatrists can 
save time by focusing on drug treatments). Based on his experience working 
as a liaison psychiatrist in a large medical hospital, one of the authors (PC) 
believes that psychiatry itself is stigmatized within medicine and that some 
psychiatrists feel that they will be respected more by their medical colleagues 
if they approach mental disorders from a biological perspective. PC also 
senses that some patients might prefer this attitude, feeling exonerated if they 
are told that their mental disorder is due to a “chemical imbalance in the 
brain”, which can be ameliorated by a drug. 
 
(3) People suffering from mental disorders are socially stigmatized and are 
frequently described in derogatory terms as “mad”, “crazy” or “weird”. The 
term “stigma” comes from the ancient Greek word denoting the mark made by 
a pointed instrument on slaves. Stigma involves negative associations that 
attach to a social group. The sociologist Erving Goffman12 argued that 
stigmatized people are considered abnormal by society and are not fully 
socially accepted. Those who are stigmatized, including people with mental 
disorders, constantly try to adjust their social identities as a consequence. 
These additional cognitive and social burdens increase the pressures upon 
stigmatized persons, exacerbating their already difficult social and cognitive 
situation. Thornicroft13 points out that patients often describe the stigma they 
encounter as worse than the mental disorder itself. Stigma affects every aspect 
of their lives, including employment, accommodation, financial resources and 
sense of citizenship. It is a major problem throughout the world. 
 
One of the negative stereotypes associated with mental illness is that people 
with a mental illness are responsible for their condition. For example, people 
suffering from depression are often told to “get a grip” or to “pull themselves 
together”. Illness, not only mental illness, is often seen as a mark of moral, 
social and epistemic failure; e.g. drug/alcohol dependency is sometimes seen 
as weakness of will. Such failures are shaped by group-specific values and 
commitments – for instance, certain religious groups regard depression as a 
punishment by God for their sins.14  
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However, in a legal setting, the poor insight of patients about their mental state 
may be recognized by the court as a factor which reduces their responsibility 
for their actions. While this diminishes the patients’ epistemic status on the 
one hand, it also protects them, on the other hand, so recognition of their 
diminished responsibility, in the case of homicide for instance, may lead to 
them being hospitalized rather than to imprisoned. 
 
Thus those who are influenced by these stereotypes may feel justified in 
cutting funding for mental health services because they think that many 
psychiatric patients are to blame for their mental and other problems. In the 
case of depression, for example, many people who have no personal 
experience of depression tend to think that depressed people only need to 
think more positively for their depression to disappear.15 The fact that within 
the NHS psychiatric services are more poorly funded than other services 
suggests that negative stereotypes about mental disorders may play a role in 
funding distribution. These negative stereotypes are also influential within the 
broader context of widespread ignorance about the true nature of mental 
disorders and their treatment. 
 
Types of stigma and their effects 
 
General stigma  
 
General stigma has negative effects on the prevention, early intervention, and 
treatment of mental disorders. The formulation of a diagnosis has the advantage of 
making resources available for treatment, as well as providing the best available 
treatment. Moreover, there is evidence that early treatment, e.g. in the case of 
schizophrenia, improves the prognosis.5  But having a diagnosis also leads to stigma 
and discrimination which can act as a barrier to recovery, e.g. make it more difficult 




People with mental illness often accept and internalize negative stereotypes, and this 
in turn leads to low self-esteem, shame, demoralization, confidence loss and giving up 
goals. 
 
Structural stigma and discrimination 
 
Patients typically report that they feel their views are not sufficiently elicited or 
considered by those who plan and organize psychiatric services.16 We have already 




1. SPECIFIC CONTRIBUTORY CONDITIONS 
 
So far we have discussed global contributory conditions for epistemic injustice. In 
addition to these global conditions there are specific problems which can lead to 
further kinds of epistemic injustice as a consequence of the particular nature of the 
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mental disorder in question. Here are two possible examples, which illustrate how the 
symptoms of particular disorders may reduce the credibility of what patients report 




The first example is dementia, an acquired impairment of cognitive function without 
impairment of consciousness. The central feature of its commonest form, Alzheimer’s 
disease, is memory loss, especially of episodic memory, but there can be a wide range 
of other cognitive impairments as well. The main negative stereotype associated with 
dementia is the belief that the impairment of cognitive function is severe and global; 
that the person has or will rapidly and inevitably become a “vegetable”. In fact this is 
hardly ever the case, except perhaps in the final stage of the illness.17  
 
The personality of the individual and some cognitive functions are often well 
preserved. Thus patients suffering from mild to moderate dementia can be much more 
reliable informants than they are often thought to be. There is a need for careful 
neuropsychological assessment to establish the severity of the impairment. If a 
person’s memory is badly affected, much can be gained e.g. by staying in the present 
in conversations, thereby minimizing the occurrence of behavioral markers of 




The second example is schizophrenia. Perhaps the most common stereotype of 
schizophrenia is that because of their delusional beliefs, those who suffer from the 
disease are unpredictable and violent. This may diminish the status of schizophrenic 
patients as truth-tellers because it may be concluded from the fact that they wrongly 
believe that someone wants to kill them, for instance, that none of their beliefs are 
credible. Although violent behavior can occur, it is much rarer than is thought. There 
is a small but significant increase in violence in schizophrenic patients (in any one 
year 8% of schizophrenic patients will commit an act of violence compared with 2% 
of the general population). There is, however, a much stronger association between 
violence and substance abuse than with schizophrenia. The proportion of all violent 
acts committed by those with schizophrenia is 3-4%. This leaves 96-97% of all 
violent acts committed by people who don’t suffer from this disorder. The risk of an 
individual patient with schizophrenia committing homicide is less than 1 in 3,000, 
which is small. Moreover the rates of suicide are much higher than homicide rates in 
psychiatric patients as a whole. Thus, although the risk of violence is higher in 
schizophrenic patients than in the general population, the risk is lower than is 
suggested in the media.18  
  
Such negative stereotypes are problematic for several reasons, beyond their empirical 
inadequacy. They encourage unwarranted attitudes of suspicion and distrust towards 
schizophrenic persons, which, in turn, can contribute to their social isolation, which is 
in itself epistemically impairing. Many of our epistemic practices are intrinsically 
social, such as testifying (giving information to others) and interpreting (making sense 
of one’s experiences) and it is no coincidence that Fricker focuses her analysis of 
epistemic injustice upon those two practices.2 Social isolation and epistemic 
impairment can be mutually reinforcing.  
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In the case of schizophrenia, this problem takes on a specific form: it is integral to our 
social and epistemic agency that other people perceive us as a person – an agent – 
capable of engaging, in a sustained and reasonable way, in testifying, interpreting, and 
other epistemic practices. A self is a locus of epistemic and social agency. Yet 
stereotypes about schizophrenia abide, typically the widespread but mistaken notion 
that schizophrenia is chiefly characterized by a personality split, as in the good Dr 
Jekyll and the evil Mr Hyde. The term ‘schizophrenia’ was coined by the psychiatrist 
Eugen Bleuler to capture a split between components of the mind, i.e. between 
knowledge, emotion and will. This idea of a split has been abandoned in modern 
diagnostic criteria.19 However, the stereotype of “split personality” is, of course, a 
perfect example of a fragmented epistemic self with whom one cannot effectively 
engage either socially or epistemically. 
 
The rare cases of homicide by schizophrenic patients are given intense coverage in the 
press. Examples include Christopher Clunis, who killed a stranger who happened to 
be standing on the same tube platform at Finsbury Park tube station in 1992; or 
Matthew Williams, who had a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia and killed a young 
woman in an act of cannibalism in 2014. This creates the impression that violence on 
the part of schizophrenic patients is much more common than it in fact is, a 
phenomenon described by the psychologist, Daniel Kahneman, as “what you see is all 
there is”, i.e. jumping to conclusions from limited evidence: another feature of 
prejudice that might lead to epistemic injustice.20  Such jumping to conclusions on 
limited evidence can lead to prejudice (“schizophrenic patients are violent”) and 
hence to epistemic injustice, if a patient says she does not have violent thoughts and is 
not believed. As demonstrated in this section, the specific deficits found in dementia 
and schizophrenia can increase the susceptibility of such patients to epistemic 
injustice, in addition to the global factors which apply to all mental disorders. 
 
 
2. POSSIBLE WAYS OF COMBATTING EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE 
 
One effective way to integrate the subjective perspective of patients into medicine and 
psychiatry may be changes in medical and psychiatric training. Some medical schools 
have introduced Balint groups for students in their early contact with patients. These 
groups, originally set up by Hungarian psychoanalyst Michael Balint for GPs in the 
UK, emphasize the psychological aspects of patient care. Similarly, ‘Schwartz 
Rounds’, which allow health professionals to focus on the existential, ethical, and 
personal aspects of a medical case, are growing in popularity in the UK. We suggest 
that this approach should not only be taught to medical students but should become 
part of clinical practice.21  Regular interpersonal dynamic meetings with members of a 
multidisciplinary team, which create a forum for discussing problematic emotional 
contacts with patients, can enhance understanding of these aspects of patient care and 
reinforce their importance.11  
 
Medical students should be taught to believe what psychiatric patients tell them, 
unless there is good reason not to do so. Students are frequently told to put patients 
first, but the experience of many patients is that they are often treated as cases rather 
than people, and that what is important to doctors is different to what is important to 
patients. By listening carefully to what patients tell them, doctors can make a 
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conscious effort to imagine how things seem from the patient’s perspective. In this 
way the relationship can become a genuinely collaborative one, rather than one in 
which the doctor decides what is in the patient’s best interest.22  
 
Fricker2 notes that hearers, in this case the physicians, need to practice giving more 
credibility to members of groups they fear they may be giving too low levels of 
credibility to: in this context, to psychiatric patients. Hearers may become aware of a 
cognitive dissonance: they may notice that on occasions they fail to live up to their 
belief that members of these groups are to be taken seriously, and then make a 
conscious effort to give them a higher level of credibility. The hope is that, with time, 






We have suggested that there is even greater risk of epistemic injustice in psychiatry 
than in general medicine. There is a need for psychiatrists to be trained to listen 
carefully to what patients are telling them and to engage with them in collaborative 
decision-making; to allow patients to have a greater epistemic role and to overcome 
the risk of epistemic injustice. Changes are also required in the social and political 
arena. Media editors should reduce the stigmatization of psychiatric patients in media 
reports, especially if epistemic failure (such as reliance on negative stereotypes) can 
be a cause of moral failure (such as treating persons with mental disorders in an 
unfairly hostile or suspicious manner). Similarly, politicians should ensure that there 
is a fairer distribution of health care resources, not merely to mitigate the economic 
cost of mental ill health.  
 
Prejudices against people with mental disorders are entrenched in our society in what 
Fricker2 calls the ‘collective social imagination’. They go unchecked because they 
operate below the radar of the conscious scrutiny of our own beliefs. Those who are 
in a position to influence public opinion, have a special responsibility to combat these 
prejudices. We hope that this paper will increase awareness of the risks of epistemic 
injustice in psychiatry and thus contribute to this goal. 
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